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NOTES
STEERING THE MOST APPROPRIATE COURSE BETWEEN
ADMIRALTY AND INSOLVENCY: WHY AN
INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY TREATY SHOULD
RECOGNIZE THE PRIMACY OF ADMIRALTY LAW OVER
MARITIME ASSETS
Melissa KS. Alwang*
INTRODUCTION
Many experts on international insolvencies have called for an inter-
national insolvency' treaty to resolve the problems encountered by
the increasing number of transnational businesses facing bankruptcy
under multiple and often conflicting national laws.2 Such an insol-
vency treaty may well call for universalism: a single primary bank-
ruptcy forum which will control all of the debtor's assets, regardless of
location, and adjudicate the creditors' claims under a single bank-
ruptcy law.' When an insolvent company's operations span several
countries, the company may be subject to conflicting national bank-
* This Note would not have been possible without the never ending patience
and support of Wesley Alwang and Linda and Larry Scharer, and the sweet smiles of
Augusta Alwang to keep me going.
1. If a debtor cannot pay his obligations to creditors he may become insolvent.
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 605 (10th ed. 1993). Once the court finds
the debtor insolvent, that court will adjudicate the creditors' claims against the insol-
vent debtor's estate under bankruptcy law. See 1 J. Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Inter-
national Insolvency and Bankruptcy, § 1.02[4], at 2-35 to 2-39 (1984) (discussing the
requirement of a finding of insolvency to trigger various national bankruptcy lavs).
In this Note, the term "bankruptcy" refers to any adjudication under bankruptcy law
unless otherwise specified.
2. See Richard A. Gitlin & Evan D. Flaschen, The International Void in the Law
of Multinational Bankruptcies, 42 Bus. Law. 307, 311-13 (1987) (advocating the adop-
tion of bilateral and multilateral bankruptcy treaties to achieve greater cooperation in
international bankruptcy proceedings); Jay L. Westbrook, Developments in Transna-
tional Bankruptcy, 39 St. Louis U. LJ. 745, 746 (1995) [hereinafter Westbrook, Devel-
opments] (summarizing recent developments in international insolvency and calling
for further harmonization); Jay L. Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global In-
solvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 Am. Bankr. LJ. 457, 457-58(1991) [hereinafter Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism] (proposing a "universalist
regime" to harmonize choice of law and choice of forum rules among nations). Addi-
tionally, a model act for encouraging universality, the Model International Insolvency
Cooperation Act ("MIICA"), has been proposed either as an alternative or as a stop-
gap until a treaty can be enacted. John A. Barrett et al., Proposal for Consultative
Draft of Model International Insolvency Co-operation Act for Adoption by Domestic
Legislation With or Without Modification, 17 Int'l Bus. Law. 323, 327 cmt. to § 7
(1989) [hereinafter MIICA].
3. Martin N. Flics & Michael J. Ireland, Bankruptcy and the Problems of Multi-
Jurisdictional Workouts, in International Commercial Agreements 415,420 (PLI Com.
L. & Practice Course Handbook 1991); Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 2, at 322; MI-
ICA, supra note 2, at 323 ("[U]niversality... envisions a single administration of the
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ruptcy laws. This conflict may lead one judicial system to refuse to
defer to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding conducted under a law
based on opposing principles.4 Additionally, a court may refuse to
enforce the judgments reached by a court applying conflicting law.5
Moreover, when an insolvency spreads across several nations, differ-
ent courts may not treat creditors equally,6 creditors may not realize
the highest possible returns from the sale of assets,7 and the parties
may be unable to realize the benefits of reorganization.8 A universal-
ist international insolvency treaty would resolve these problems by en-
suring cooperation and mutual recognition of bankruptcy proceedings
involving various nations' courts.9
Despite the benefits of a universal insolvency system, a treaty im-
plementing such a system would have an adverse impact on another
specialized area of law, admiralty. 10 Both admiralty and bankruptcy
laws apply when a shipowner becomes insolvent." Admiralty laws,
unlike bankruptcy laws, are substantially similar internationally. 12
Moreover, the decisions of a court, exercising admiralty jurisdiction
insolvent debtor's estate, providing protection of the estate and an equitable distribu-
tion of assets... in liquidation, or equitable administration in a reorganisation .. .
4. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text (discussing how the refusal to
defer leads to duplicative proceedings).
5. See infra notes 69-74, 79-81 and accompanying text (discussing how nonrecog-
nition can deter international business both through a lack of finality in bankruptcy
judgments and by increasing risk and transaction costs).
6. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text (discussing how the pooling of
assets under a unified distribution scheme provides for equal treatment of creditors).
7. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text (discussing how both duplication
and piecemeal distribution of a company's assets may result in lower returns to
creditors).
8. See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text (discussing how reorganization
benefits both creditors and debtors by maintaining the company's value).
9. See infra notes 64-96 and accompanying text (discussing how cooperation
among courts will create a superior bankruptcy system).
10. This Note uses the terms admiralty and maritime interchangeably to refer to
the general law of the maritime industry.
11. See, e.g., In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 69 B.R. 439, 441-43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1987) (demonstrating that both bankruptcy and admiralty law are implicated when
creditors of a shipping company seek to recover debts); Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v.
Hellenic Lines Ltd., 38 B.R. 987, 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that this case "squarely
present[s] the jurisdictional and procedural conflicts between this court, sitting in ad-
miralty, and the Bankruptcy Court"); In re Aro Co. Ltd., 1980 All E.R. 1067, 1070
(C.A.) (considering the status of a maritime lien in a bankruptcy proceeding). Arrest
of a ship often halts the operations of a shipowner and precipitates bankruptcy. See,
e.g., USA: Awards and Settlements; Bankruptcy Caused by Wrongful Seizures of Ves-
sels, Lloyd's List, Lloyd's Info. Casualty Rep., May 14, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Reuter Textline File (describing how vessel arrests so disrupted the
operation of a shipping company that the company was forced to declare bankruptcy);
UK. Seizures and Arrests- Unclassified Report Under this Heading; Nortankers,
Lloyd's List, Lloyd's Info. Casualty Rep., Apr. 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Reuter Textline File (describing how Nortankers was "fighting to avoid bank-
ruptcy" after arrest of one of its vessels).
12. Edward M. Keech, Problems in the Liquidation and Reorganization of Interna-
tional Steamship Companies in Bankruptcy, 59 Tul. L. Rev. 1239, 1255-56 (1985); see
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pursuant to an arrest13 in rem,'14 receive international recognition.15
Admiralty law enforces maritime financial obligations through the
creation of maritime liens. Maritime liens arise from the operation of
admiralty law rather than as a result of the agreement of two parties.16
Maritime liens arise in response to, among other things, torts involv-
ing the ship or its cargo, salvage operations, agreements to lease the
vessel (in maritime terms "charter parties"), supplies, repairs, mort-
gages on the ship, and wages owing to the crew. The lien gives the
holder the right to proceed in rem against an appropriate vessel or the
pending freights and subfreights.' 8 The maritime lienor can request
that a court arrest the vessel against which he has a lien. Admiralty
law will not permit the release of the vessel until the creditor is
satisfied.' 9
A conflict arises when the owner of the arrested vessel is also a
party to a bankruptcy proceeding and the vessel is not in the same
country as the bankruptcy proceeding. Bankruptcy law regards the
vessel as part of the debtor's estate2 and thus subject to the jurisdic-
also Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black, Jr., The Law of Admiralty 45 (2d ed. 1975)
(describing admiralty law as an existing valid law prior to any national legislation).
13. The term arrest under admiralty law refers to a court's physical seizure or
attachment of the vessel. See infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
14. In rem jurisdiction arises upon the arrest of a vessel. 1 Thomas J. Schoenbaum,
Admiralty and Maritime Law 517 (2d ed. 1994). "In rem" is "[a] technical term used
to designate proceedings or actions instituted against the thing, in contradistinction to
personal actions, which are said to be in personam." Black's Law Dictionary 793 (6th
ed. 1990).
15. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 38 B.R. 987, 999 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (recognizing that "[o]nly an admiralty court can... deliver a vessel free and
clear of all liens" and releasing maritime lienors to pursue their claims in admiralty);
The Trenton, 4 F. 657, 659 (E.D. Mich. 1880) ("[Tlhe sale of a vessel. . . will be held
valid in every other country, and will vest a clear ... title in the purchaser ....");
Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 588-89. The in rem nature of the proceeding
creates the universal recognition. Keech, supra note 12, at 1259.
16. Maritime liens are unique in this respect. See generally Gilmore & Black,
supra note 12, at 587-89 ("A lien is a lien is a lien, but a maritime lien is not.").
17. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the
Arrest of Sea-Going Ships, May 10, 1952, art. 1 [hereinafter 1952 Arrest Convention],
reprinted in Francesco Berlingieri, Arrest of Ships: A Commentary on the 1952
Arrest Convention, 185-86 (1992). The 1952 Arrest Convention is in effect in 57 na-
tions, although not in the United States. Berlingieri, supra, at 11 n.42 [hereinafter
Berlingieri].
18. See 2 Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 485-88. Freights are the money payable,
either by the charterer of the ship or a shipper, to the owner for the use of the ship.
Id. at 194. Subfreights, as the name implies, are the moneys due from third parties for
either subcharter or shipping. See 2 Benedict on Admiralty § 45, 3-65 to 3-70 (7th ed.
1994) (describing how the shipowner has a lien on "any amount due under the char-
ter"); Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 195 (describing how the charterer can sub-
charter the vessel).
19. The creditor may be satisfied either by payment of the lien, posting bond or
other security, or judicial sale of the vessel. See Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at
588, 796.
20. The debtor's estate consists of all the debtor's assets which are available to
satisfy the claims of creditors. Dalhuisen, supra note 1, § 1.04[1], at 2-72 to 2-84 (citing
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tion of the court administering the insolvency.2 Nevertheless, if the
vessel arrives in a port of a foreign jurisdiction that does not recognize
another nation's bankruptcy law, the court in that foreign jurisdiction
may arrest the vessel to enforce maritime liens pursuant to admiralty
law. The vessel and the creditors who seek satisfaction from its sale
are therefore subject to proceedings in two nation's courts under two
different bodies of substantive law. The simultaneous adjudication of
a single debt by two systems creates problems.
While nations typically recognize an admiralty decision of another
country's court,2- they will not always recognize a bankruptcy adjudi-
cation by a foreign court.' A bankruptcy treaty between countries
can provide that each country will accept and enforce the bankruptcy
judgments rendered by courts of other signatory nations.24 Therefore,
a universally accepted international insolvency treaty should, in the-
ory, achieve universal acceptance and enforcement of bankruptcy
judgments. Universal accord is, however, an unrealistic goal.' Insol-
vency experts agree that a treaty that creates a truly universal bank-
ruptcy system is not feasible, 26 and proposals for treaties concentrate
on resolving practical conflicts between bankruptcy laws and estab-
lishing a consistent approach to jurisdictional questions.27 Because
bankruptcy law is closely allied to a nation's social and political
goals,' even an international insolvency treaty with less ambitious
goals than true universality can achieve, at best, only partial interna-
the applicable laws of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, the
United States, and the Netherlands); see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (1994) ("The dis-
trict court... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever located,
of the debtor.... ."); 1 & 2 International Loan Workouts and Bankruptcies 137, 173,
224, 273, 379, 428, 456, 541, 568, 595, 674, (Richard A. Gitlin & Rona R. Mears eds.,
1989) [hereinafter International Loan Workouts] (noting that the extent of the
debtor's estate under the laws of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Israel,
Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Venezuela includes all available as-
sets of the debtor).
21. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
22. Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 588-89. The in rem nature of the proceed-
ing creates the universal recognition. Keech, supra note 12, at 1259.
23. See Thomas M. Gaa, Harmonization of International Bankruptcy Law and
Practice: Is it Necessary? Is it Possible?, 27 Int'l Law. 881, 885, 888 (1993).
24. See id. at 903-05.
25. See infra notes 97-114 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Gaa, supra note 23, at 885-98 (discussing the many barriers to harmo-
nization of international bankruptcy law); Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra
note 2, at 461 (advocating the concentration of efforts on pragmatic, rather than theo-
retical, goals).
27. Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 2, at 312 (acknowledging that the drafters of the
European Union Treaty realized that the goal of a single law was "'far too ambi-
tious "); see generally Michael J. Bonell, International Uniform Law in Practice-Or
Where the Real Trouble Begins, 38 Am. J. Comp. L. 865 (1990) (discussing the obsta-
cles to uniformity in bankruptcy laws); Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra
note 2, at 457 ("Pragmatism dominates the worldwide effort to find a solution to the
problem of transnational business bankruptcy.").
28. Gaa, supra note 23, at 884-85.
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tional acceptance; only countries who are major trading partners or
who have similar social and political goals will sign.2 9 This Note refers
to this phenomenon of partial acceptance, when some but not all
countries agree to an international insolvency treaty which is drafted
to achieve some measure of universality, as "partial universality."
Because of its contrast to the partially universal recognition of
bankruptcy law, the universal recognition of judgments under admi-
ralty law should be of great significance to the framers of an interna-
tional insolvency treaty. The present international insolvency treaty
discussions should recognize the unique status accorded to the adjudi-
cations of a court acting under admiralty law.
This Note argues that the drafters of any international insolvency
treaty should include a provision recognizing the primacy of admiralty
law over maritime assets because of the particular concerns of the
maritime industry and the nature of maritime law. Such a provision
will eliminate the problems that arise when the two areas of law over-
lap. Moreover, such a provision will not prejudice any of the parties
involved in the bankruptcy. Part I of this Note gives a brief summary
of bankruptcy law and explains why, although universality is a lauda-
ble goal, an international insolvency treaty is unlikely to achieve it.
Part II provides a brief summary of admiralty law and explores how a
partially accepted insolvency treaty will not successfully preclude a
foreign court applying admiralty law from arresting vessels that are
part of the debtor's bankruptcy estate and selling them outside of the
bankruptcy proceeding. Part EI details the problems that result when
admiralty and bankruptcy law intersect. Part IV argues that a provi-
sion in an international insolvency treaty recognizing the primacy of
admiralty law over vessels and maritime lienors would eliminate the
problems arising from the application of the two laws without preju-
dice to any of the parties to the bankruptcy process. This Note
concludes that the drafters of an international insolvency treaty
should include an express provision recognizing admiralty law
as the exclusive body of law governing vessels3° and guaran-
29. Id. at 896. Countries with similar cultural goals will have similar bankruptcy
laws; thus, their laws will be easier to harmonize. Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism,
supra note 2, at 471. For example, an insolvency treaty is in force between the Scandi-
navian nations but includes no non-Scandinavian nation, and the Bustamante Code
harmonizes the insolvency law of 15 Latin American nations. Kurt FL Nadelmann,
Bankruptcy Treaties, 93 U. Pa. L. Rev. 58, 70-71 (1944). The European Union Con-
vention on Insolvency Proceedings applies only to member states. Convention on In-
solvency Proceedings, 1995, European Union (Initialed Draft) (on file with the
Fordham Law Review). These countries have acknowledged the commonality of their
interests by joining the Union in the first place. See George A. Bermann et al., Cases
and Materials on European Community Law 29-30 (1993).
30. The same lien attaches to a vessel as well as to its pending freights and
subfreights (essentially the accounts receivable). Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 487-
88. The issue of whether the freights and subfreights should also be subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the admiralty court is beyond the scope of this Note.
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teeing the right of maritime lienors to pursue their claims in
admiralty.3
I. BANKRUPTCY AND THE PURSUIT OF AN ELUSIVE IDEAL OF
UNIVERSALITY
Bankruptcy law developed on a national level, to adjudicate claims
relating to local land-based assets.3z Consequently, the mechanics of
bankruptcy law are best suited to that type of asset.3 3 This section
first offers a brief analysis of bankruptcy law. Next, it explores why
bankruptcy practitioners and commentators view universality as an
ideal goal. Finally, this part demonstrates why universal acceptance of
an international insolvency treaty is unlikely.
A. Bankruptcy Law Basics
Bankruptcy law empowers the court to adjudicate all claims against
the estate of an insolvent debtor.' Once a bankruptcy proceeding
begins, the court administering the bankruptcy claims authority over
all of the debtor's assets35 and all of the creditors within the reach of
the court's process. 3 6 Many courts have broadly construed the reach
of their nation's bankruptcy laws.37 The United States Code, for ex-
ample, states, "The district court ... [has] exclusive jurisdiction of all
of the property, wherever located, of the debtor. '38
Bankruptcy law developed in response to matters of local concern. 39
Thus, each nation's bankruptcy laws reflect that nation's social and
political goals.40 For example, the United States, "a society which
31. International insolvency commentators have acknowledged that different
types of property demand different legal treatment. Westbrook, Theory and
Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 470.
32. Timothy B. DeSieno, Reorganizing an International Shipping Concern in
Bankruptcy: Two Sources of Jurisdictional Difficulty, 5 Bankr. Devs. J. 325, 331
(1987).
33. Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 597.
34. Dalhuisen, supra note 1, § 1.01[1], at 2-11 to 2-12, § 1.02[4], at 2-35 to 2-39.
35. Id. § 2.02[2], at 3-156.1 to 3-160.
36. See, e.g., United States Lines, Inc. v. GAC Marine Fuels Ltd. (In re McLean
Indus.), 68 B.R. 690, 700 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (requiring a finding of in personamjurisdiction over a creditor before holding it liable for its violation of the automatic
stay).
37. Maxwell Communication Corp. v. Barclays Bank (In re Maxwell Communica-
tion Corp.), 170 B.R. 800, 811 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[T]he [debtor's] estate is
defined to include property overseas ... ."), aff'd, 186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Gaa,
supra note 23, at 887.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (1994); see supra note 20 (defining the debtor's estate
under the laws of various nations).
39. See DeSieno, supra note 32, at 331.
40. See Dalhuisen, supra note 1, § 1.01[3], at 2-18 (explaining how each country's
public policy affects its conception of equal treatment for creditors); Gaa, supra note
23, at 885 ("[B]ankruptcy laws.., embody fundamental social and economic poll-
des."); Douglass G. Boshkoff, Some Gloomy Thoughts Concerning Cross-Border In-
2618 [Vol. 64
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prides itself on a philosophy and practice of equal opportunities...
does not tolerate a debtor's being reduced to an inferior position only
because of misfortune."'" Therefore, in the United States, bankruptcy
law ensures the debtor the opportunity for a fresh start." In France,
preserving employment is a dominant concern of the bankruptcy law;
thus French bankruptcy law favors maintaining a business as a going
concern.43 Countries less sympathetic to the debtor's predicament
and the economic welfare of employees, such as Germany and the
Netherlands, view bankruptcy laws merely as the expression of the
state's power to enforce the debtor's private obligations to his credi-
tors." As a result, Germany and the Netherlands continue to permit
the imprisonment of debtors.45 An international insolvency treaty
would displace these national laws-laws serving a particular nation's
social and political goals-in favor of an international law, which by
its nature can serve no single nation's goals. Thus, any change in a
nation's bankruptcy law brought about by an international treaty will
affect that nation's sovereign interest in the advancement of its social
and political goals.
Despite the variety of social and political views embodied in the
bankruptcy laws of various nations, all bankruptcy laws resolve the
debtor-creditor relationship through one of two processes. Liquida-
tion is the process by which the bankruptcy trustee46 collects the
debtor's property, converts it to cash, and distributes the cash to credi-
tors.47 The second process, reorganization, allows the debtor to retain
its assets and continue in operation while paying creditors over an ex-
solvencies, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 931, 935-36 (1994) (noting that insolvency laws reflect
social ambitions).
41. Dalhuisen, supra note 1, § 3.10, at 1-118.
42. Gaa, supra note 23, at 885.
43. 1 International Loan Workouts, supra note 20, at 340.
44. See Dalhuisen, supra note 1, § 1.01[3], at 2-16 (discussing how some countries
view liquidation as "procedure of a private law nature within the context of a public
law execution device").
45. Dalhuisen, supra note 1, § 1.01[1], at 2-11.
46. Almost all western bankruptcy systems give title of a bankrupt's estate to an
administrator or trustee and empower that individual to compel the return of all the
bankrupt's assets, prevent further collection efforts, void preferences, and distribute
assets equally among creditors. Keech, supra note 12, at 1241.
47. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-726 (1994) (codifying the administration, collection, and
liquidation of the debtor's estate); see generally Dalhuisen, supra note 1, § 1.06[1]-[2],
at 2-124 to 2-132.1 (describing liquidation provisions in the bankruptcy laws of
Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy, West Germany, the Netherlands, England, and
the United States); 1 & 2 International Loan Workouts, supra note 20 (describing the
bankruptcy processes of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, France, England, Mexico,
The Netherlands, Switzerland, Venezuela, Israel, Italy, Japan, Germany, and the
United States).
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tended period of time.48 Some countries, such as the Netherlands and
Mexico, do not permit reorganization.49
A moratorium on creditor action, often called a stay, is one of the
tools used by courts to administer the estate of an insolvent debtor.50
The court administering the bankruptcy needs time to ascertain the
full scope of the debtor's situation before adjudicating a resolution.5
Thus, the stay serves essentially as an injunction,52 enabling the court
to stop any other actions on the debtor's estate, freeze the status quo,
and examine the problems that need resolution.53 Once the court de-
clares a moratorium on creditor action, creditors within its jurisdiction
cannot pursue any alternative collection efforts.54
Bankruptcy law categorizes creditors into classes to organize the
bankruptcy process. "Secured" and "unsecured" are two broad
classes of creditors. A secured creditor is one who has an interest in a
debtor's property to "secure repayment of a debt contractual in its
origin. 55 This securing interest may take the form of a lien.56 An
unsecured creditor, as the name implies, is a creditor who does not
have such an interest in a debtor's property to secure repayment of
the debt. Under bankruptcy law, the court will satisfy the claims of
secured creditors before unsecured creditors.57 A bankruptcy code
48. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1129 (1994) (codifying the administration and filing of a
reorganization plan); In re Ross, 95 B.R. 509, 510 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (explaining
how reorganization allows the debtor to defer payments to creditors); Dalhuisen,
supra note 1, § 2.06[1], at 2-193 to 2-203 (describing the process of reorganization
under the laws of Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands,
England, and the United States).
49. See Flics & Ireland, supra note 3, at 424 (noting that the Netherlands and
Mexico "simply do not rehabilitate debtors").
50. Graydon S. Staring, Bankruptcy-An Historical View, 59 Tul. L. Rev. 1157,
1175-76 (1985). Many bankruptcy laws provide for some sort of restraint on creditor
collection activities. Westbrook, Developments, supra note 2, at 754; see, e.g., 11
U.S.C. § 362 (1994) (providing for an automatic stay in United States bankruptcy pro-
ceedings); Dalhuisen, supra note 1, § 2.03[1], at 2-164 to 2-166 (explaining and citing
the stay provisions of the bankruptcy laws of France, Belgium, Italy, and Germany); 1
International Loan Workouts, supra note 20, at 125, 161, 215 (providing explanations
of the stay provisions of Argentine, Brazilian, and Canadian laws by practitioners in
those nations).
51. Westbrook, Developments, supra note 2, at 754. The court adjudicating the
bankruptcy may also use the moratorium to promote agreement among creditors. Id.
52. Staring, supra note 50, at 1176.
53. Westbrook, Developments, supra note 2, at 754.
54. Id.; see, e.g., Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs., 49 B.R. 614, 618
(S.D.N.Y.) (explaining and deferring to Swedish stay provision), aff'd, 773 F.2d 452
(2d Cir. 1985).
55. Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 586.
56. Id.
57. Dalhuisen, supra note 1, § 1.06[1] at 2-124 to 2-125; see also id. § 1.06[2], at 2-
125 to 2-132.1 (describing the specific distribution procedures and priorities of Eng-
land, the United States, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, West Germany, and the
Netherlands).
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will use more specific classes in its statutory hierarchy to refine further
the order in which funds are distributed.s
Bankruptcy law relies on "land-based liens" to determine the rights
of secured creditors.59 Such liens are intended to apply to land-based
assets.60 Several creditors may have liens on the debtor's property.
The first lien on a land-based asset has priority over later liens be-
cause a later creditor has the ability to ascertain the presence of prior
liens on the asset.61 Once attached to an asset, the lien remains "in-
delible" until the payment of the obligation it secures.62
While these few general concepts, liquidation, reorganization, in-
junctive stays, and liens, can be found in most nations' bankruptcy
laws, the laws differ significantly in specific implementation depending
upon the particular nation's social and political goals.63 An insolvent
transnational business and its creditors may proceed in several courts
under several conflicting national bankruptcy laws. As discussed be-
low, a bankruptcy proceeding is more efficient and just when the en-
tire bankruptcy is adjudicated by a single court rather than by a
multitude of countries examining piecemeal aspects of the insolvency.
B. Universality as an Ideal Goal
The universality theory of bankruptcy advocates that each interna-
tional bankruptcy proceeding should take place within a single na-
tion's court under a single universal bankruptcy law.64 This section
first addresses how a universal law would eliminate the problems that
result from the nonrecognition of foreign bankruptcy proceedings and
the nonenforcement of foreign bankruptcy decrees.65 This section
then examines the benefits of universality, including the equal treat-
58. For example, in France the rules governing priority are extremely complex,
including special categories for salary claims, pledgees, general preferences, and spe-
cial preferences. See 1 International Loan Workouts, supra note 20, at 352-53. In
Japan, creditors can be secured, generally preferred, unsecured, or subordinate un-
secured. See 2 International Loan Workouts, supra note 20, at 499-500.
59. Land-based liens are usually known simply as liens. As other commentators
have, this author refers to such liens as land-based liens to distinguish them from
maritime liens. See, e.g., Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 589 ("[Mlaritime liens
and land liens have little in common.").
60. Id at 597.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 596. The lien is "indelible" because it remains attached to a piece of
property even though the property itself may change ownership. Id.
63. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text
64. See Flics & Ireland, supra note 3, at 420. For over 100 years, commentators
have lauded the ideal that an entire insolvency should be subject to resolution in a
single bankruptcy forum. Boshkoff, supra note 40, at 939 (citing John Lowell, Conflict
of Laws as Applied to Assignments for Creditors, 1 Harv. L. Rev. 259, 264 (1888)); see
supra note 2 (listing articles calling for a universal insolvency treaty).
65. Gaa, supra note 23, at 886-87 (discussing the problems of nonrecognition and
nonenforcement of foreign bankruptcy adjudications).
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ment of creditors,66 the maximization of asset return,67 and the facili-
tation of attempts to reorganize an ailing debtor.68
1. Problems Arising from the Absence of International
Cooperation
A universal bankruptcy law would solve many problems that cur-
rently plague international bankruptcies, including the nonrecognition
of foreign discharges,69 the duplication of bankruptcy proceedings,7 °
and the increased costs of international business transactions.71 Con-
flicts over the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction and differing sub-
stantive laws will often prompt a nation's courts to refuse to recognize
or enforce the bankruptcy adjudication of a foreign court.72 One type
of adjudication not uniformly recognized between courts is a foreign
discharge.73 If a court has discharged the debtor in one bankruptcy
proceeding and that debtor has assets in another country that does not
recognize the first proceeding, creditors whose claims remain unpaid
after the first adjudication will reassert those claims in the
nonrecognizing country.74 The court in the nonrecognizing country
may then seize the debtor's assets in that country to satisfy the claims
of such creditors. Such a result inhibits the debtor from doing future
business in any country that does not recognize his prior bankruptcy
discharge.
Another problem arising from the nonrecognition of foreign bank-
ruptcy proceedings is the duplication of bankruptcy proceedings.
Creditors can proceed against the debtor or the debtor can file for
bankruptcy protection in each country in which the debtor has as-
sets.75 Such duplication is a problem because multiple bankruptcy
66. Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 466. The equitable distri-
bution of assets is one of the goals common to many bankruptcy laws. Dalhuisen,
supra note 1, § 1.01[3], at 2-17 to 2-18.
67. Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 465-66.
68. See Flics & Ireland, supra note 3, at 420 (noting that the ideal method of adju-
dicating a bankruptcy in a single universal proceeding offers "a much greater chance
of rehabilitation").
69. See John D. Honsberger, Conflict of Laws and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, 30 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 631, 664-66 (1980). Discharge is the legal release of a
debtor from the obligation to pay his debts. See id. at 663.
70. See Charles D. Booth, Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: An Analysis and
Critique of the Inconsistent Approaches of United States Courts, 66 Am. Bankr. L.J.
135, 136 (1992).
71. Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 460-61.
72. See Gaa, supra note 23, at 885-91.
73. Honsberger, supra note 69, at 665-66; see also Westbrook, Developments,
supra note 2, at 757 (discussing the theoretical problem of nonrecognition of
discharge).
74. See Westbrook, Developments, supra note 2, at 756-57.
75. See Flics & Ireland, supra note 3, at 420-21; Gaa supra note 23, at 904-05.
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proceedings often necessitate extensive duplicate filings7 6 as well as
repetitive litigation in different jurisdictions." Moreover, such dupli-
cation encourages forum shopping by allowing the creditors and debt-
ors to pursue multiple adjudications to get the result they want.78
A final problem is that the nonrecognition of foreign bankruptcy
proceedings increases the cost of each international transaction by
creating excess risk and higher transaction costs. A creditor, at the
time it extends credit, cannot predict with certainty which country will
adjudicate a future insolvency or which country's law will apply.79
Thus, the parties involved cannot accurately predict the results of de-
fault and need to compensate for the extra risk involved in the com-
mercial transaction.80 Transaction costs increase because the lawyers
involved need to negotiate specific provisions at each stage of the
transaction and bankruptcy processes to control the result for their
client.8' If all courts recognized a universal bankruptcy law, such
problems would cease to exist.
2. Benefits of Universality
A universal bankruptcy system would do more than resolve the
present problems faced by insolvent transnational businesses; it would
also provide new benefits, including equal treatment of creditors,
maximization of returns to creditors, and facilitation of international
reorganization. Universality would ensure the equal treatment of
creditors within a particular class because a universal law would em-
power a single forum' to control all of the debtor's assets.a8 A single
forum would then pool all the debtor's assets, enabling the court to
satisfy all creditors from a single fund.' Creditor satisfaction from a
single pool ensures the equal treatment of creditors of the same class
because all creditors will have the same access to the debtor's assets
76. See Flics & Ireland, supra note 3, at 454 (noting the extensive filing require-
ments for bankruptcy proceedings).
77. Booth, supra note 70, at 136.
78. Gaa, supra note 23, at 904-05; see Flics & Ireland, supra note 3, at 419 (noting
that debtors and creditors will have a preference for jurisdictions most favorable to
their own interests).
79. See Flics & Ireland, supra note 3, at 421.
80. Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 460.
81. See Flies & Ireland, supra note 3, at 450-61 (giving specific advice for maximiz-
ing creditor return during drafting, prebankruptcy workout, and formal bankruptcy
stages).
82. The universal law would provide for a method of choosing one forum from all
of the nations in which the debtor has assets. See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism,
supra note 2, at 464.
83. See Booth, supra note 70, at 138; Keech, supra note 12, at 1239-40. Bank-
ruptcy laws distribute assets according to a hierarchy of defined classes of creditors.
Dalhuisen, supra note 1, § 1.06[1]-[2], at 2-124 to 2-132.1; see supra notes 55-58 and
accompanying text.
84. See Westbrook, Developments, supra note 2, at 755-56 (detailing a coordinated
claims procedure).
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and will be subject to the same class definitions. Without a single fo-
rum, if the bankruptcy proceedings take place in two countries, credi-
tors in the same class may recover different amounts. For example,
the debtor may have many assets in country A but only a few assets in
country B. If each country conducts an independent bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, the creditors of a given class X may recover in country A and
not in country B because the many assets in country A may be enough
to satisfy all the creditors, while the few assets in country B may not
be sufficient. Thus, unless the class X creditor is willing to pursue re-
covery in country A, he may receive less than he would have had the
assets been pooled in a single forum. 5 Moreover, creditors who
would be part of one class under one bankruptcy law may be part of a
different class under the law of a second country.86 This change in
class status may push a creditor into a position of lower priority. Simi-
larly, even if the creditor falls into the same class in both proceedings,
dual proceedings may affect an individual creditor's recovery because
the class in country A may have a high priority, while the same de-
fined class in country B may have a low priority.
Universality would maximize returns to creditors for two reasons:
the cost of the action in a single court is lower because of the elimina-
tion of duplicative proceedings, 87 and proceeds from the sale of assets
are higher when a trustee can take advantage of natural economic
units of sale. 8 The latter advantage will not be available if a local
bankruptcy proceeding can claim jurisdiction over an asset of the
debtor that would be more valuable if sold as a package with the
debtor's other assets that are located in other nations. For example, a
vertically integrated business may mine raw materials in one country
to use in products it manufactures in another. Sale of the integrated
business will likely yield more than the sum of the proceeds from sell-
ing the manufacturing and mining operations separately. 9 The sale of
the entire multinational business, however, often requires the cooper-
ation of sovereign nations.
From both the debtor's and creditor's viewpoints, reorganization9"
works best if a single forum can protect all of a debtor's assets. 91 Re-
organization often requires that a business keep all its vital assets to-
85. See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 460.
86. See In re Toga Mfg. Ltd., 28 B.R. 165, 168-69 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (noting
that a creditor who would be one of the first to receive payment under American law
was in a much less favorable position under Canadian law).
87. See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 465-66.
88. Id. at 461 ("[T]he piecemeal dismemberment of the enterprise, without regard
to natural economic units of sale, greatly lessens the prices obtained for assets and
lowers the return available to claimants.").
89. See id. at 465 (discussing how the preservation of a going concern is "likely [to]
increase returns to creditors greatly").
90. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
91. See Keech, supra note 12, at 1248.
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gether. Reorganization is unlikely if foreign creditors can attach, in
multiple countries, the assets necessary for the debtor to continue op-
erating.93 For the debtor, a successful attempt at reorganization al-
lows it to repay its debts over an extended period of time while
remaining in control and possession of its property. 4 For the credi-
tors, if the reorganization fails, the sale of the debtor's business as a
going concern rather than as a collection of individual assets may max-
imize their returns.9 5
Despite the clear advantages of universality to creditors collectively,
each individual creditor will not necessarily cooperate toward achiev-
ing a universal bankruptcy system. An individual creditor would pre-
fer nonuniversality-multiple fora and multiple laws-whenever his
chances of recovery would be greater under that approach.9 There-
fore, all the participants in the bankruptcy process will not realize the
benefits of universality unless a universal insolvency treaty compels
them to take part in a single proceeding under a unified law.
C. Obstacles to Achieving Universal Bankruptcy Law
An international insolvency treaty may aspire to universality-a
universal bankruptcy law and a single controlling forum for each inter-
national bankruptcy. 7 Commentators and drafters of international
treaties realize, however, that true universality is unattainable." Not
all nations will sign a treaty' because nations will not agree to a treaty
that creates a uniform law that is unresponsive to the important policy
92. See Benjamin Weintraub & Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy Law Manual § 8.10,
at 8-19 (rev. ed. 1986) (identifying the need of a business undergoing reorganization
to use all of its assets in ongoing operations free from financial pressures); Robert A.
James & J. David Kirkland, Jr., Adequate Protection Through Augmented Interests in
Reorganization Plans, 58 Am. Bankr. L.J 69, 82 (1984) (noting that reorganization is
thwarted if the assets necessary for the business to continue in operation are trans-
ferred out of the debtor's estate).
93. Keech, supra note 12, at 1247.
94. See In re Ross, 95 B.R1 509, 510 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988).
95. James S. Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights In Reorganiza-
tion: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy
Clause, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 973, 975 (1983) (stating that "[t]he central assumption of the
reorganization.. . is that the value of an enterprise as a going concern will often
exceed the liquidation value of the enterprise's assets."); Westbrook, Theory and
Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 465.
96. Keech, supra note 12, at 1241 ("Equality of treatment for creditors is a fine
principle, but few creditors have been known to subscribe to it voluntarily if it meant
paying back the fruits of vigorous collection activity .....
97. See Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 2, at 322-23.
98. See supra note 27 and accompanying text; see also Westbrook, Theory and
Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 461 (noting that although general agreement exists on
the principle of universality, the principle is frustrated in practice).
99. See Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 2, at 322-23 (noting that international uni-
formity is realistically unobtainable); Kurt H. Nadelmann, International Bankruptcy
Law Its Present Status, 5 U. Toronto LJ. 324, 344 (1944) (noting that all prior efforts
to achieve a treaty acceptable to all nations have failed).
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variations among signatories. 10 The wide variety of policies underly-
ing national bankruptcy laws is a significant barrier to any insolvency
treaty. 0 1
Bankruptcy laws are inherently national laws; nations created bank-
ruptcy laws in response to local social and political goals.1 02 These
policies may differ radically among nations 10 3 and are not easily har-
monized."° A treaty can attempt to resolve such differences by either
forging a single bankruptcy law or creating choice-of-law provisions
that require the application of a particular nation's law in specific cir-
cumstances. Nevertheless, a nation will not agree to a treaty that sub-
stantially alters its present law and requires it to undermine the
economic and social interests of the local population. 0 5 Similarly, a
nation will not agree to choice-of-law provisions if the result under the
chosen law might compel a nation's bankruptcy court to act counter to
that nation's own social and political goals.
10 6
Moreover, bankruptcy treaties historically have been successful
only where the signatory nations have shared social or economic
goals.'0 7 Thus, only three multilateral international insolvency treaties
100. See Gaa, supra note 23, at 905 (noting the inflexibility of the universal ap-
proach in accommodating the varying policy differences).
101. See id. at 893; supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
102. DeSieno, supra note 32, at 331; see supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text
(giving examples of social and political goals and the bankruptcy laws that resulted).
103. See Gaa, supra note 23, at 893; see supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text
(discussing how the United States favors debtor rehabilitation, while France favors
maintaining employment, and Germany and the Netherlands seek to compel the
debtor to pay his debts by criminal penalties, if needed).
104. Gaa, supra note 23, at 897.
105. See Boshkoff, supra note 40, at 936 (" 'Any attempt at harmonizing insolvency
law strikes at the heart of deep-seated cultural differences and legal codes founded on
quite different principles.'" (quoting Harmonizing European Insolvency Laws - A
British Perspective, reprinted in Wkly. News & Comment, Bankr. Ct. Dec., Dec. 10,
1992, at A3)); Gaa, supra note 23, at 897 (noting that nations are more likely to agree
on narrow issues such as jurisdiction than a unified bankruptcy law that would require
changes to the long legal traditions of each nation).
106. See Booth, supra note 70, at 136 (noting that cooperation among bankruptcy
courts has been limited by each nation's protection of domestic interests); David C.
Cook, Prospects for a North American Bankruptcy Agreement; Les Prospects Pour
Une Convention De La Faillite En Amerique Du Nord; Los Prospectos Para Un Con-
venio De Quiebra De Notre Amdrica, 2 Sw. J.L. & Trade Am. 81, 89 (1995) (describing
how the European nations' "refus[al] to sway from their philosophical and political
beliefs" presented a barrier to the creation of an international insolvency treaty); cf.
id. at 93 (describing how under the Bustamante Code courts could "still favor local
creditors by not enforcing the treaty or creating exceptions"); MICA, supra note 2, at
326, § 4 cmt. (noting that "the constraints of public policy" may require the modifica-
tion of a universalist system).
107. See Nadelmann, supra note 29, at 61, 92 (noting that insolvency treaties have
been concluded between neighboring states or otherwise geographically united areas
or between countries sharing a common language). Shared economic goals are, how-
ever, only a starting point. Gaa, supra note 23, at 896 (noting that "economic integra-
tion and commercial ties alone do not assure success in harmonizing bankruptcy
laws").
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exist today: the Bustamante Code, among fifteen Latin American na-
tions; 08 the European Union Treaty, limited to Europe; °' and the
Scandinavian Convention, binding Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Nor-
way, and Sweden.110
Despite the individual differences among nations' policies, one con-
stant is present: A nation's courts favor creditors within that nation's
borders."1' The corollary of that constant is that a nation's courts will
not cooperate with foreign courts if that cooperation will harm the
financial interests of local creditors. 12 Nations may predicate cooper-
ation on a quid pro quo. Only major trading partners, 13 countries
that believe that cooperation will as often favor their local creditors as
it will disadvantage them, or countries that tend to "offer each other
reciprocal treatment," are likely to sign an insolvency treaty." 4
Therefore, an international insolvency treaty that attempts to create a
universal bankruptcy system will achieve only partial acceptance, and
thus only "partial universality."
Although bankruptcy law claims complete control over the adjudi-
cation of an insolvent debtor and its creditors, it is not the only law
which may apply. Admiralty law provides a parallel system for en-
forcing certain claims relating to maritime creditors. Admiralty law
arose from a different confluence of circumstances than bankruptcy
108. The 15 signatories in 1928 were Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Nadelmann, supra note 29, at 70-71.
109. Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, 1995, European Union (Initialed
Draft) (on file with the Fordhan Law Review.
110. See Gaa, supra note 23, at 883 n.6. Both the Scandinavian and Latin American
treaties have existed for some time, while the European Union Treaty is of recent
vintage. See Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 2, at 311.
111. See Dalhuisen, supra note 1, § 1.02[1], at 3-9 (describing how the recognition
of foreign judgments is limited by the states' "desire to protect their own economic
life" and "give their own subjects particular advantages at the expense of others");
Gaa, supra note 23, at 894-95 (noting that "[d]iscriminatory treatment of foreign cred-
itors imposes a fundamental barrier" to cooperation); Mary Elaine Knecht, Com-
ment, The "Drapery of Illusion" of Section 304-What Lurks Beneath: Territoriality
in the Judicial Application of Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, 13 U. Pa. J. Int'l
Bus. L. 287,298 (1992) (characterizing § 304 of the United States Bankruptcy Code as
protecting the interests of United States claimholders).
112. See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 460 (noting that co-
operation with foreign courts is limited to the "rare case where local assets more than
satisfy local claimants"). At present, the United States bankruptcy courts appear to
cooperate with foreign bankruptcy proceedings only when United States creditors will
not be adversely affected by such cooperation. Knecht, supra note 111, at 300.
113. See Gaa, supra note 23, at 896. Reciprocity is often the basis for extending
comity. See, e.g., Felixstowe Dock & Ry. v. United States Lines Inc., 1989 Q.B. 360,
389 (refusing to grant comity because "if the boot were on the other leg" the United
States court would not release assets to England).
114. See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 467-71 (arguing that
reciprocity is crucial because countries will agree to cooperate based on a rough wash
of results and that similarity of laws makes it easier for countries to accept the risk
that their law may not be applicable in a particular instance).
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laws and thus enforces creditors' rights in a different manner than
bankruptcy laws.
II. ADMIRALTY LAW: A UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED SYSTEM
Admiralty law applies to financial claims on vessels. 1 5 Bankruptcy
and admiralty laws overlap when a shipowner becomes bankrupt. A
vessel is one of the debtor's assets and maritime lienors are a discrete
class of creditors in a larger bankruptcy proceeding. While theoreti-
cally a court of general jurisdiction may apply both bankruptcy and
admiralty law to the disposition of land-based and maritime assets, a
single court is unlikely to be both the forum administering the bank-
ruptcy and to be in possession of the maritime assets pursuant to an
arrest in rem. Further, under some legal systems, a single court may
be unable to exercise both admiralty and bankruptcy jurisdiction.
Portugal, for example, provides for separate admiralty courts, 16 while
the United States system includes separate bankruptcy tribunals.' 17
Bankruptcy and maritime laws are, moreover, distinct. First, unlike
bankruptcy laws, admiralty laws are substantially similar among na-
tions.11 8 Moreover, a court's judgment under admiralty law, pursuant
to an arrest in rem, receives international recognition.119 These two
distinctions result from several factors. Maritime law is not directly
linked to the sovereign interests of a nation, because unlike bank-
ruptcy law, which developed with an eye to national social and polit-
ical goals, 120 maritime law arose in response to the needs of
international commerce.' 2' Additionally, bankruptcy law developed
under the assumption that the assets and creditors involved would be
within the same local area. 122 The reverse is true of admiralty law.
The maritime industry geared admiralty law to the highly mobile na-
ture of the maritime assets involved. 123
This part first provides a brief summary of admiralty law. It then
explores how a partially accepted international insolvency treaty will
not prevent all courts from arresting and selling vessels pursuant to
admiralty law, regardless of a foreign bankruptcy proceeding that the-
oretically has jurisdiction over the vessels.
115. See Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 586-89.
116. See Berlingieri, supra note 17, at 135 (describing the 1986 Portugese law that
created separate admiralty courts).
117. See Weintraub & Resnick, supra note 92, § 6.04[2], at 6-15 to 6-16.
118. See Keech, supra note 12, at 1255-56.
119. See Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 787-88.
120. See supra note 39-45 and accompanying text.
121. Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 4-5, 8-11 (discussing factors influencing the
development of maritime law).
122. See supra notes 59-62.
123. See Keech, supra note 12, at 1242-44.
2628 [Vol. 64
ADMIRALTY AND INSOLVENCY
A. Admiralty Law Basics
Unlike bankruptcy law, which embodies a variety of national social
and political principals, admiralty law arose in the context of interna-
tional maritime commerce. 24 Admiralty law is the system of law for
the maritime industry." Participants in the industry had to develop a
system of credit that would be effective for internationally mobile
property.126 The system relies on maritime liens to determine mari-
time creditors' claims on a vessel.'27 Maritime liens are internation-
ally recognized'2 as giving the lienor129 the ability to arrest a vessel
and hold it as security until an admiralty court can enforce a judgment
on the merits.'30
Admiralty did not require "express or implied legislative action on
the part of any one nation to make it valid.' 31 The law developed out
of the general maritime custom in England and Western Europe
which spread by colonization around the globe.' 32 Thus, in the United
States, a body of maritime law already existed at the time of the draft-
ing of the Constitution. 33 Chief Justice Marshall commented in 1828
that a "case in admiralty does not... arise under the Constitution or
124. See Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 4-5, 8-11.
125. Id. at 1.
126. Id. at 597.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 787-88. While nations differ as to what gives rise to a maritime lien, such
distinctions do not affect the recognition of the admiralty adjudication. Id.;
Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 515-19. For example, United States law provides for
the creation of liens in more circumstances than is usual in international practice. Id.
at 518. Nonetheless, the decisions of a United States court exercising admiralty juris-
diction receive full recognition internationally. Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at
787-90. Further, the differences among laws regarding maritime liens have been suc-
cessfully harmonized by international treaty. 1952 Arrest Convention, supra note 17,
art. 1 (conforming the laws of signatory nations concerning what constitutes a mari-
time claim). Where different standards apply, the country in which the ship is located
may only arrest a vessel if the events giving rise to a lien created in a foreign port
would also give rise to a lien in the country where the ship is presently located.
Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 518-19.
129. The lienor can be anyone who holds a maritime lien, including the material-
man (the supplier of goods to the ship), a sailor injured while on board, a sailor owed
wages, or a bank holding a mortgage on the vessel. 1952 Arrest Convention, supra
note 17, art. 1; see also Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 483-84 (describing the situa-
tions that give rise to a maritime lien under United States law). Maritime lienors may
also obtain their liens as a result of assignment. See id. at 486.
130. Berlingieri, supra note 17, at 38. The maritime lien represents both ajus in re
(a right in the property) and a jus in ren (a right against the property). Schoenbaum,
supra note 14, at 481. This situation gives rise to the admiralty maxim:
No jus ad rem
Will comfort them
Whose jus in re
Has gone away.
Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 589 n.lb.
131. Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 45.
132. Id. at 10.
133. Id. at 45.
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laws of the United States. These cases are as old as navigation itself,
and the law.. . as it has existed for ages, is applied by our Courts. ' 134
Because the common needs of the industry rather than particular cir-
cumstances of each individual nation influenced the creation of the
law, admiralty laws are substantially similar among nations. 135 Com-
mentators call maritime law "the law of nations," regarding it as a
universal law.13
6
The maritime industry required a single law to enforce financial ob-
ligations acquired internationally. Maritime law fulfills this need by
the creation of maritime liens on a vessel.137 Maritime liens are legal
rather than contractual in nature.138 For example, a sailor who suffers
an injury on ship has a lien which arose and attached to the vessel
automatically upon the injury.' 39 Admiralty law provides that mari-
time creditors who hold maritime liens on a vessel are entitled to di-
rect a local court to arrest that vessel while it is in any port.' 40 The
maritime lien thus allows the creditor to enforce a financial obligation
that arose under the admiralty law of one nation in the court of an-
other nation.' 4 1
Once a maritime lienor decides to enforce his lien, the arrest of the
particular vessel in a port allows the local court to exercise admiralty
jurisdiction over that vessel.142 Any maritime lienor may direct a local
court to arrest the vessel to which his lien attaches; maritime law does
not require the arresting lienor to be the last in time or the highest in
rank. The process of arrest, however, varies internationally as to both
134. American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545-46 (1828).
135. Keech, supra note 12, at 1256 ("Mortgages are usually enforceable .... the
rights of crew members can be protected, and contracts can be enforced almost wher-
ever the ship sails."); see Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 45; see, e.g., ABC Ship-
brokers v. The Ship "Offi Gloria," 3 N.Z.L.R. 576, 579 (H.C. 1993), available in
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, NZCAS File ("Counsel are.., agreed that the law of Cyprus
is ... the same as the law of the United Kingdom and that the law of New Zealand...
[is] the same as the law of the United Kingdom.").
136. Keech, supra note 12, at 1255-56.
137. Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 481-82.
138. See Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 587 ("[T]he parties cannot by agree-
ment confer lien status on a claim which is not by nature a lien claim or waive the
conditions for attachment.").
139. See Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 490 ("A maritime lien arises from the mo-
ment of the... occurrence that provides its basis.").
140. See Berlingieri, supra note 17, at 120-23 (analyzing the degree to which claim-
ants must substantiate their claims to have a vessel arrested). The procedural law of
the United States is codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 31325-31326 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). For
a detailed explanation of United States procedure, see John S. Rogers, Enforcement
of Maritime Liens and Mortgages, 47 Tul. L. Rev. 767 (1973).
141. Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 517-18.
142. In common law countries, like the United Kingdom, the arrest of a vessel cre-
ates jurisdiction. Berlingieri, supra note 17, at 166-70. Civil law countries, like Italy,
often require some other additional link to the arresting forum to create jurisdiction
to adjudicate the maritime dispute. Id. at 167 & n.315. Under the 1952 Arrest Con-
vention, presence is enough for arrest. Id. at 166-67 (noting that the 1937 Paris Con-
ference reached a consensus that arrest is a means of obtaining jurisdiction).
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the mechanics and the extent to which a lienor must prove his under-
lying claim.' 43 The differences in procedural laws do not affect the
universal recognition granted decrees under admiralty law because
the grant of recognition arises from the in rem arrest. ' The differ-
ences are further resolved by treaty; under the 1952 Arrest Conven-
tion, the "law of the Contracting State in whose jurisdiction the arrest
was made" governs the rules of procedure. 45
The debtor-owner' 46 has three options once a creditor has arrested
the ship pursuant to a valid maritime lien. The first option is to pay
the creditor and secure the release of the ship. 147 The debtor may also
post a bond or some other security to free the arrested vessel. 148 Fi-
nally, if the debtor will not pay or post a bond or other security, the
local court may sell the vessel and distribute the proceeds to the mari-
time lienors. 49 In each case, the vessel sets sail again only after the
debtor satisfies the claims of the maritime lienors.' 50
The maritime lien is designed to facilitate international commerce.
For example, contracts between suppliers in port and a shipowner are
difficult to create and enforce because the ship is often in a different
country than its owner. To ameliorate this problem, a maritime lien
for supplies to a vessel attaches to that vessel automatically upon the
143. See id. at 120-26. Generally, the law regarding arrest of ships differs between
civil and common law systems. Id. at 6. In civil law systems any creditor, maritime or
not, may have a court arrest a vessel to prevent the possessor from absconding with a
valuable asset, while in common law countries a court may arrest a ship only where
the creditor has a maritime lien specifically entitling him to proceed in rein. Id.
144. See Keech, supra note 12, at 1259.
145. 1952 Arrest Convention, supra note 17, art. 6.
146. The vessel is, by means of a legal fiction, often technically considered the
debtor although the debt itself may be an obligation incurred by either the owner or a
third party. Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 594-96. Thus, to prevent sale of his
vessel, the owner may have to pay the maritime liens incurred by a charterer. See id.
at 615. The personification of the vessel is an eroding anomaly of admiralty law and
has been subject to criticism. See George K. Walker, The Personification of the Vessel
in United States Civil In Rem Actions and the International Law Context, 15 Tul. Mar.
LJ. 177, 180-82 (1991).
147. See Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 588.
148. 1952 Arrest Convention, supra note 17, art. 5; Berlingier, supra note 17, at 138(noting that bail or other security can be exchanged for the ship); Gilmore & Black,
supra note 12, at 796.
149. See e.g., 46 U.S.C. §§ 31325-31326 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (codifying the arrest
procedure of the United States); Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 507 (describing the
process of foreclosure under United States law); South Africa: Sailing into Danger-
South Africa Top of the World Ship Arrest League, Lloyd's List, May 30, 1995, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter Textline File [hereinafter South Africa]
(describing the process of arrest and sale under South African Law); Lewis Baglietto,
Gibraltar: Special Report-Admiralty Law Ensures Popularity as Jurisdiction, Lloyd's
List, Jan. 8, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter Textine File (describing
the process of arrest in Gibraltar, under British law). The priorities of categories of
maritime liens are determined by the law of the arrest forum. Gilmore & Black, supra
note 12, at 701.
150. See Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 588 (stating that the decision of the
district court exercising admiralty jurisdiction "scrapes the ship free of claims").
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furnishing of those supplies. 151 The supplier cannot know what other
liens are already attached to the vessel because no local record can
keep track of all the liens an internationally traveling vessel has accu-
mulated. To encourage the supplier to extend credit, maritime law
provides that the last lien on the vessel has the highest priority; new
liens supersede existing liens. 5 ' Additionally, if the lienholder does
not enforce the lien promptly by directing a court to arrest the vessel,
the lien may be lost through laches.'53
Foreign courts recognize each other's admiralty decrees pursuant to
an arrest in rem. 54 The court must have in rem jurisdiction over the
vessel for a decree to enjoy this international recognition. 155 Once a
creditor asserts a lien and arrests a ship, he cannot assert the same lien
in a second arrest proceeding even if the debt remains outstanding.1 56
If the arrested vessel is sold by the court, the sale of the vessel extin-
guishes all maritime liens on the vessel, 57 even those claims of lienors
who did not participate in the admiralty sale and had no notice of it.'58
Upon leaving the court, the newly sold ship is thus universally recog-
nized as free of all liens.
B. Maritime Obstacles to Universal Bankruptcy Law
Bankruptcy works best when all the debtor's assets and all parties
with an interest in the insolvency are under a single court's jurisdic-
151. See Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 490.
152. See id. at 509.
153. See Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 764; Jonathan M. Landers, The Ship-
owner Becomes a Bankrupt, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 490, 510 (1972). Laches is an equitable
defense that allows the debtor to avoid paying the debt by claiming the creditor did
not act promptly enough to enforce the lien. Black's Law Dictionary 875 (6th ed.
1990).
154. See Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 787-88.
155. A court adjudicating a bankruptcy in the United States has the authority to
sell a vessel, and commentators feel that the sale should receive international recogni-
tion provided that the court had in rem jurisdiction over the vessel. Schoenbaum,
supra note 14, at 521-22 & n.18. In the usual case, however, the United States bank-
ruptcy courts will prefer to release a ship to a nonbankruptcy court for sale under
admiralty law. See, e.g., In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 69 B.R. 439, 451 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1987) (allowing the federal district court "in light of its specialized nature and exper-
tise ... to rank maritime liens, hold a sale of [the] vessel" and distribute proceeds
(citations omitted)); Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 38 B.R. 987, 990-
91, 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (releasing the vessel and stating that only an admiralty sale is
recognized internationally); see also In re Carlomagno Shipping, S.A., 185 B.R. 25, 27
(E.D. La. 1995) (holding that a court's arrest and sale of the vessel pursuant to admi-
ralty law, subsequent to the bankruptcy proceeding's release of the vessel, vested the
second court with exclusive jurisdiction over the sale proceeds).
156. Berlingieri, supra note 17, at 108-09; Landers, supra note 153, at 510 ("[A] lien
may ... be destroyed without notice to the lienor if the vessel is arrested by ...
another admiralty court .... ").
157. 46 U.S.C. § 31326(a) (1988); In re Prudential Lines, 69 B.R. at 451; see also
Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 786-88 (stating that only an admiralty sale enjoys
global recognition).
158. Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 588, 787.
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tion.159 When a partially accepted international insolvency treaty en-
ters the picture, only signatory nations will be able to harmonize
bankruptcy proceedings. 160 A bankruptcy that involves maritime as-
sets, however, is highly likely to involve the courts of nations whose
only connection with each other is a floating vessel. Such nations will
not necessarily be major trading partners or share similar social and
political goals. 16  For example, the collision of two vessels off the
coast of Aruba was adjudicated in the District Court of Delaware be-
cause the two injured ships had limped into Delaware.16 The mari-
time law of Aruba applied, the plaintiff shi owner was Dutch, and the
defendants were Bahamian and Japanese;' the crews were South Ko-
rean, Dutch, and American. 6' All of these nations are unlikely to
sign the same international insolvency treaty. 6 In a New Zealand
case, while the shipowner was undergoing an insolvency proceeding in
Texas,"6 the vessel, registered under the flag of Cyprus, was arrested
in New Zealand (after aborted attempts to arrest it in Indonesia,
Hong Kong, and Singapore), 167 and plaintiffs were Greek' 6s and
American. 169 Again, these radically different nations are unlikely to
sign an international insolvency treaty.
The effect of nonsignatories is critical in the maritime context be-
cause a ship travels internationally and exposes itself to arrest in any
nonsignatory country.' 70 Three ways exist in which a ship can risk
arrest when an international shipping company declares bankruptcy.
First, the ship is in a nonsignatory nation when the action begins. In
the case of international shipping companies, at the time of the bank-
ruptcy filing the vessels are likely to be scattered around the globe. 17 '
159. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
160. See Booth, supra note 70, at 138 (1992); Keech, supra note 12, at 1257
(" '[U]niversality... cannot function without universal acceptance.' "(quoting John
D. Honsberger, Conflict of Laws and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,30 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 631, 634 (1980))).
161. Prior successful treaties have been between major trading partners or similar
nations. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
162. Cliffs-Neddrill Turnkey Int'l-Oranjestad v. M/T Rich Duke, 734 F. Supp. 142,
144-45, 148 (D. Del 1990).
163. Id. at 144-45, 148.
164. Id. at 149.
165. See supra notes 97-114 and accompanying text (explaining the types of com-
mon interests that will lead nations to agree on an insolvency treaty).
166. ABC Shipbrokers v. The Ship "Offi Gloria", 3 N.Z.LR. 576, 578 (H.C. 1993),
available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, NZCAS File.
167. Id. at 584.
168. See id. at 579 (describing plaintiff as having a registered office in Greece).
169. Id. at 584.
170. See Keech, supra note 12, at 1247 (noting that vessels "which may have been
kept free from attachment at home, [are] dispatched abroad into the clutches of for-
eign creditors").
171. See, eg., id. at 1244 n.31 (noting that in one case vessels were scattered in the
Philippines, Japan, and the United States). Similarly, airplanes may not be located in
the nation where the owner will file bankruptcy. Airplanes, however, can speedily
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For example, when Hellenic Lines 72 declared bankruptcy in the
United States it had a fleet of twenty-eight vessels; six were arrested in
the United States and eleven in foreign ports.173 In the second scena-
rio, the ship travels to a nonsignatory nation while the debtor attempts
reorganization.174 Finally, the vessel may travel to a nonsignatory na-
tion after the signatory nation's court has sold the vessel as part of a
liquidation. In each of the three scenarios, the vessel may eventually
arrive at a nation that is not a signatory to an international insolvency
treaty. Once in such a nation, maritime lienors unrestrained by the
bankruptcy court's stay may arrest the ship and disregard the bank-
ruptcy adjudication.175 Thus, both the diversity of nations involved in
maritime disputes and the necessity of continual international move-
ment for an operating vessel mean that unification of bankruptcy pro-
cedures is inadequate to ensure equal treatment of all maritime
creditors.
Admiralty law is already universal; it applies to maritime disputes
all over the world. 176 An international insolvency treaty is unlikely to
achieve the same global recognition of bankruptcy adjudications. A
country in possession of a vessel subject to maritime liens will adjudi-
cate claims under admiralty law unless it recognizes a national or for-
eign bankruptcy proceeding involving the ship. 177 Thus, when a
debtor is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding in a nation which is part
of a partially accepted insolvency treaty and the country in possession
of the ship is not part of that same treaty, the possessing country will
return home when bankruptcy looms. See, e.g., id. at 1244 n.30 (noting that Braniff
Airlines waited for most of its airplanes to return to its Dallas base before filing a
bankruptcy petition).
172. Hellenic Lines was an international shipping company. Kenneth N. Gilpin,
Hellenic Lines in Chapter 11, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1983, at Dl.
173. Id. at D6.
174. See Keech, supra note 12, at 1247 (noting the potential for seizure of a vessel
during each trip it makes beyond the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court); see also
Kevin Done, Creditors of Collapsed Swedish Group Act to Settle Debts, Fin. Times,
Dec. 21, 1984, at 1-2 (discussing how the local court administering the bankruptcy
released vessels against the wishes of local creditors).
175. See Keech, supra note 12, at 1245-46 (noting that lienors outside the jurisdic-
tion of the bankruptcy court will not be "restrained from enforcing their liens"). If
the bankruptcy adjudication is proceeding at the time the vessel is arrested, the lien-
ors within the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction would, presumably, face sanctions for
disobeying the court's moratorium on creditor action. This Note assumes that the
bankruptcy court has the power to order effective sanctions to deter foreign actions
by creditors subject to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. In the United States,
whether the bankruptcy court or only the district court has contempt powers is the
subject of debate. William S. Parkinson, The Contempt Power of the Bankruptcy Court
Fact or Fiction: The Debate Continues, 65 Am. Bankr. L.J. 591, 597-600 (1991).
176. See Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 8-11 (describing how maritime law
spread through colonization); Keech, supra note 12, at 1255-56 (noting that admiralty
lawyers expect international uniformity).
177. See Keech, supra note 12, at 1245 (describing the concerns of maritime credi-
tors); George Rutherglen, Admiralty and Bankruptcy Revisited: Effects of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 503, 527-528, 531-32 (1991) (same).
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apply admiralty law to the vessel and maritime lienors, and ignore the
bankruptcy proceeding. 178 At this point, the two bodies of law apply
simultaneously to the same asset. Maritime lienors will be caught in
the middle as each court will attempt to adjudicate the rights of the
parties.
III. PROBLEMS THAT ARISE WHERE ADMIRALTY AND A
PARTIALLY UNIVERSAL BANKRUPTCY LAW INTERSECT
Both bankruptcy and admiralty law can apply when the owner of a
vessel becomes insolvent. The bankruptcy law created by a partially
accepted international insolvency treaty would, presumably, share cer-
tain of the present attributes of individual national bankruptcy laws.' 7 9
Under a treaty, the court in a signatory nation would have the power
to control all creditors who are subject to jurisdiction in other signa-
tory nations.'80 Additionally, the court acting under an insolvency
treaty would claim jurisdiction over the vessel, wherever located, just
as national bankruptcy laws now provide jurisdiction over the estate
of the debtor, including all assets wherever located.' 81 The vessel and
the maritime lienors, however, would also remain subject to adjudica-
tion under admiralty law. A maritime lienor seeking to enforce his
claim would direct a court to arrest the vessel pursuant to admiralty
law, and the arresting court would claim jurisdiction over the vessel
because possession of the vessel creates jurisdiction.' 2 Moreover,
when the arresting court sold a vessel, admiralty law would dictate
that the sale extinguished all maritime claims on the vessel,"s even
those claims of nonparticipating maritime lienors.18
This part will examine three problems arising from the concurrent
jurisdiction of the two bodies of law over a single asset. First, the
maritime lienors' rights to enforce their claims are placed at risk. Sec-
ond, even if the court administering the bankruptcy ultimately re-
leases these lienors to protect their interests, the initial bankruptcy
proceeding creates unnecessary expense. Finally, the increased risks
and expenses incurred by lienors will make the capital available for
shipbuilding more expensive.
178. See Rutherglen, supra note 177, at 532-33.
179. See Nadelmann, supra note 29, at 69 (describing how understanding the 1889
Treaty on International Commercial Law requires understanding the individual bank-
ruptcy laws of the signatories).
180. See id. at 71.
181. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
182. See Berlingieri, supra note 17, at 166-67 (noting that the 1937 Paris Confer-
ence reached a consensus that arrest is a means of obtaining jurisdiction).
183. 46 U.S.C. § 31326(a) (1988); In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 69 B.R. 439, 451
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 787.
184. Landers, supra note 153, at 510.
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A. Maritime Lienors' Rights at Risk
A bankruptcy moratorium on creditor action fundamentally con-
flicts with admiralty law.'8 5 While the moratorium is in place, bank-
ruptcy law prevents creditors from acting to enforce their liens. A
vessel, however, continues to accumulate maritime liens.'8 6 Under ad-
miralty law, the last lien in time has the highest priority. 87 Thus, the
last lien will be first to receive the proceeds from the sale of an ar-
rested vessel.'88 If the lienor does not act promptly to enforce the
lien, the lien will lose priority and will eventually become unenforce-
able through laches.' 89
In the United States, no court will enforce existing or new maritime
liens if the ship is under the control of a bankruptcy court in the
United States. 9 ' Similarly, courts in nations under an international
insolvency treaty would probably not enforce maritime liens while a
bankruptcy action was proceeding in one of the signatory nations. 91
Courts outside of those signatory nations, however, would retain the
ability under admiralty law to recognize and enforce maritime liens. 19
Upon the request of a lienor, a foreign court can arrest a ship in its
port and, if the debtor does not remit the money owed, force a sale of
the vessel.' 93 The sale of the ship will extinguish all maritime liens on
it, including those of lienors who did not participate in the sale.' 94
Thus, the bankruptcy proceeding's restraint of maritime lienors from
signatory countries may result in the total loss of those creditors' liens
when a court in a nonsignatory nation sells the vessel to which they
185. See Staring, supra note 50, at 1179. As one commentator has stated: "The
peculiar admiralty rule that the last maritime lien in time takes priority [over other
maritime liens] and [a] concomitant rule that a maritime lienor must act promptly to
foreclose his liens in order to protect his rights, conflict fundamentally with the bank-
ruptcy court's policies .... " Id.
186. Keech, supra note 12, at 1246. Some maritime liens, such as liens for the
wages due the ship's master and crew, would arise automatically on a daily basis.
Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 483, 490.
187. See Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 588; Landers, supra note 153, at 510.
188. See Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 588; Landers, supra note 153, at 510.
189. See Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 586; Landers, supra note 153, at 510.
190. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4)(1994); Keech, supra note 12, at 1244 n.32.
191. Under an international insolvency treaty, nations would harmonize their bank-
ruptcy proceedings and act as one. See Nadelmann, supra note 29, at 77 (describing
how a treaty gives extraterritorial effect to all decisions by the bankruptcy court); see
supra notes 64-96 and accompanying text (describing the advantages of a universal
bankruptcy system).
192. Rutherglen, supra note 177, at 527-28 (discussing the unique problems faced
by maritime lienors when an international shipping company attempts
reorganization).
193. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
194. Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 787; Landers, supra note 153, at 510; see,
e.g., Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 38 B.R. 987, 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)(noting that a court's admiralty sale of a vessel "delivers it free and clear of all liens").
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are attached. 95 The stay on creditor action thereby disadvantages
maritime lienors subject to the bankruptcy proceeding's restraint.19 6
B. Needless Costs Related to the Bankruptcy Adjudication
Bankruptcy law traditionally favors local creditors.197 A nation's
bankruptcy procedures are unlikely to restrain that nation's creditors
from participating in a foreign admiralty action because to do so
would prejudice those creditors. Thus, the judge will probably eventu-
ally release the vessel and maritime creditors from that court's bank-
ruptcy proceedings to pursue adjudication under admiralty law.198
The intrusion of bankruptcy law into the dispute is, therefore, tempo-
rary and unnecessary.
Maritime creditors subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court suffer adverse effects from the temporary involvement of the
bankruptcy court. Once a foreign court has arrested the vessel, the
maritime lienor restrained by the bankruptcy proceeding's stay on
creditor action cannot immediately join in the foreign admiralty pro-
ceeding. The maritime lienor has the unnecessary expense ofpetition-
ing the bankruptcy court to release him from the stay.' Once
released, the maritime lienor must go to the foreign arresting court to
protect his lien. This foreign proceeding may take place in a less con-
venient-and thus more expensive-forum than the lienor would
have chosen had he been unconstrained by the bankruptcy court's stay
and thus able to arrest the ship in a port of his choosing.'
Moreover, the delay imposed by the bankruptcy proceeding is ex-
pensive for maritime lienors. The bankruptcy court resolves issues at
195. Presumably, those creditors under the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court will
be effectively deterred from violating the moratorium. See supra note 175.
196. See Rutherglen, supra note 177, at 517.
197. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (surveying literature describing
this phenomenon).
198. See, e.g., Brittain v. United States Lines, Inc. (In re McLean Indus.). 884 F.2d
1566, 1567-68 (2d Cir. 1989) (describing how the bankruptcy court modified the stay
to release the banks that held mortgages on the vessels); United States v. ZP Chan-
don, 889 F.2d 233, 234 (9th Cir. 1989) (releasing crew members to enforce their mari-
time liens for wages owed).
199. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1994) (providing for relief from the stay under
United States law if certain conditions are met); 1 International Loan Workouts,
supra note 20, at 125, 215 (describing the exceptions to an automatic stay under Ar-
gentine and Canadian bankruptcy law). Ordinarily, "[t]he secured creditor must seek
relief from the stay by written motion." Rutherglen, supra note 177, at 519.
200. The maritime lienors must assert their claims where the ship has been arrested.
See McLean Indus., 884 F.2d at 1568-69 (releasing maritime lienors from the bank-
ruptcy court's jurisdiction to pursue their claims in Singapore). The maritime lienor
who is constrained by his local bankruptcy court from arresting the ship in his local
port must therefore travel to the foreign port where unconstrained creditors arrested
the vessel. See supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
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a slower pace than a court acting under admiralty law.2 1 The bank-
ruptcy court's intervention can temporarily halt the operations of a
shipping company, leaving its ships stalled in port. Absent the bank-
ruptcy court's interference, a creditor would have immediately di-
rected a court to arrest the vessel under admiralty law.202 At least two
strategically located courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction can arrest,
sell, and get the ship out of port within four to six weeks.20 3 The in-
dustry relies on such a speedy sale to preserve the value of the asset
because vessels held in port may physically deteriorate.2°  Addition-
ally, a swift sale minimizes expenses.20 5 A shipping business is not
generating income when its vessels lie in port; rather, idle ships in port
are only accumulating custodial expenses.21 If the shipowner is insol-
vent, these expenses are a drain on the estate. Thus, even the tempo-
rary interference of the bankruptcy court harms the maritime lienor's
financial position.
The supervision of maritime lienors under the stay is unnecessary if
the bankruptcy court will eventually exempt them from bankruptcy
201. See Landers, supra note 153, at 492. The bankruptcy process is notoriously
slow moving. In Italy, bankruptcy proceedings can be as brief as four to six months or
as long as a few years. 1 & 2 International Loan Workouts, supra note 20, at 460. In
Brazil, the process takes between two and ten years. Id. at 176. In the United King-
dom, bankruptcy takes, on average, two to three years. Id. at 316. In the United
States proceedings can take three or more years. Id. at 643. Some bankruptcies ex-
ceed even the lengthy averages. The bankruptcies of LTV and the Johns-Manville
Corporation are two well-known lengthy cases. The Johns-Manville bankruptcy
lasted six years. See Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843
F.2d 636, 639-41 (2d Cir. 1988) (describing the history of the Johns-Manville bank-
ruptcy proceedings); Edward A. Adams, Parties Reach Settlement in Manville Trust
Cases, N.Y. L.J., July 28, 1994, at 1, 2. LTV took seven years to emerge from bank-
ruptcy. John Holusha, Singing the Steelworker Blues: A Mini-Mill Deal at LTV Leaves
Union Feeling Jilted, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1995, at D1, D4; see also LTV Aerospace &
Defense Co. v. Thomson-CSF, S.A. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 186 B.R. 561, 564-66
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (giving the history of the LTV bankruptcy proceedings).
202. See Landers, supra note 153, at 492-93 (describing maritime creditors' prefer-
ence for an expedited admiralty proceeding).
203. See Baglietto, supra note 149 (describing the priority that the courts of Gibral-
tar give admiralty cases and the disposition of uncontested admiralty cases within a
few weeks); South Africa, supra note 149 (describing the proliferation of vessel arrests
in South Africa because of its strategic location and efficient arrest process).
204. Berlingieri, supra note 17, at 38-39. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rec-
ognize the potential damage caused by delay in selling a vessel and allow for an inter-
locutory sale in admiralty cases. Fed. R. Civ. P., Supp. Rules for Certain Adm. & Mar.
Claims E(9)(b). Vessels often experience deterioration and decay, especially rust,
while in custody. See In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 69 B.R. 439, 450-51 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1987) (referring to the legislative history of Rule E(9)(b) to clarify why in-
terlocutory sale of vessels is permitted).
205. Expenses incurred while a vessel is in the custody of the court can exceed 40%
of the ship's value. Steven E. Psarellis et al., Bet Your Lien and Roll the Dice: Mari-
time Liens and Riverboat Gambling, 6 S.F. Mar. L.J. 49, 71 (1993). In 1986, the cost
for keeping a vessel in custody was $1300 a day. Prudential Lines, 69 B.R. at 442.
206. Costs may include "wharfage and other expenses necessary to preserve the
ship, including beneficial caretaking expenses of the master and crew." Schoenbaum,
supra note 14, at 507-08.
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law and allow them to proceed under admiralty law. The bankruptcy
court will probably eventually release maritime lienors because to do
otherwise would harm the interests of those lienors under the bank-
ruptcy court's control.20 7 This release is not immediate, however. For
example, when United States Lines filed for bankruptcy, the bank-
ruptcy court issued the stay on November 24, 198611 and did not re-
lease the maritime lienors until June 10, 1987.20 Prior to the release,
supervision is difficult because the court needs to monitor interna-
tional creditors and assets. 10 The costs of supervising the maritime
lienors under the stay might outweigh the benefits of enforcing it be-
cause of the probability of eventual release from the stay.21'
The bankruptcy court will also expend resources in litigation as a
result of creditors' attempts to circumvent the automatic stay.2 12 For
example, in In re McLean Industries,213 a creditor tried to avoid en-
forcement of the automatic stay by assigning his claims to a third
party.214 The court had to decide the legality of the assignment and
then enforce its decree which held the assignment invalid.215 Credi-
tors may also try to circumvent the stay by contesting the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction. 16 The bankruptcy court may have a broad con-
ception of its jurisdiction. 17 For example, Judge Paskay of the Middle
District of Florida asserted that his court's order was binding on all
"citizens of the United States or foreign entities which have property
in the United States [or] which maintain an office or do business in the
United States" and on foreign subsidiaries or agents of U.S. corpora-
tions. 1 Similarly, Judge Buschman of the Southern District of New
York forbade "'all persons . . . including those located outside the
United States' "from pursuing" 'judicial... action' " or any other act
to" 'exercise control over property of the debtors' estates... within or
outside the United States.' ,"219 Thus, the court may spend considera-
207. See supra part III.A and accompanying text (describing how the arrest of ships
abroad may jeopardize maritime lienholder's rights).
208. United States Lines, Inc. v. GAC Marine Fuels Ltd. (In re McLean Indus.). 68
B.R. 690, 691 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
209. In re McLean Indus., 74 B.R. 589, 589, 601 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
210. See Rutherglen, supra note 177, at 532.
211. Id
212. See, e.g., United States Lines, Inc. v. GAC Marine Fuels Ltd. (In re McLean
Indus.), 76 B.R. 291, 292-94 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (describing creditor's two-pro-
nged attempt to evade the application of the stay).
213. 76 B.R. 291 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
214. Id at 292.
215. Id. at 292-93.
216. United States Lines, Inc. v. GAC Marine Fuels Ltd. (In re McLean Indus.), 68
B.R. 690, 697 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
217. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
218. In re Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., No. 95-10453-8P1, 1995 WL 787961, at *1 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 1995).
219. Felixstowe Dock & Ry. v. United States Lines, Inc., 1989 Q.B. 360, 370 (quot-
ing the order of the United States bankruptcy judge).
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ble time and effort monitoring parties' compliance with bankruptcy
law when the disposition of the maritime assets will ultimately be sub-
ject to admiralty law.
C. Vessel Finance
Because the vessel finance market depends on the lenders' ability to
collect debt freely under admiralty law,220 the risk placed on maritime
lienors and the extra delay and expenses caused by the unnecessary
intrusion of bankruptcy law have a detrimental effect on vessel financ-
ing. Admiralty collection methods are simple and encourage invest-
ment in shipping.22' Because the maritime industry bases its financing
system on prompt vindication of a lienor's rights through the arrest of
the vessel,2 2 a bankruptcy proceeding's interference with those meth-
ods, either by placing the rights at risk or by delaying the sale of a
vessel, affects the vessel finance system. Capital for vessel replace-
ment or repair will be more expensive because the lender must take
into account the added risks faced by the maritime lienor'2 3 and the
costs associated with delay.
The effect on maritime finance is important because the maritime
industry is currently rebuilding and needs capital investment. The
world shipping fleet requires replacement both because of age and
new environmental regulations.19 Replacement costs are estimated
at $200 billion before the year 2000.1 5 The fleet, produced primarily
by a surge in shipbuilding during the period 1973-1980, 16 has a typical
lifespan of twenty years and is now due for replacement. 22 7 More-
over, the world fleet must rebuild to meet the requirements of the Oil
220. See George Rutherglen, The Contemporary Justification for Maritime Arrest
and Attachment, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 541, 562 (1989).
221. Id. ("[Arrest is] particularly attractive because... [it] enhance[s] the overall
efficiency of the market for credit in maritime commerce.").
222. See id.
223. Under a partially universal bankruptcy law, a maritime lender faces uncer-
tainty as to whether admiralty or bankruptcy law would apply because the lender
would not know what country the vessel would be in when insolvency occurred. The
risk inherent in this inability to predict the result of default is similar to the risk faced
by international land-based creditors who cannot predict which nation's bankruptcy
law will apply in the case of default. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
224. Why Ship-Owners Must Change Tack, Euromoney Corp. Fin., Sept. 16, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter Textline File.
225. Id.
226. See Jack Willoughby, Shipwreck, Forbes, July 29, 1985, at 116, 120 (illustrating
the surge in shipbuilding graphically by the growth in overall tonnage from 1973
onward).
227. Hong Kong: Sohmen Takes Over as Chairman of New ICAC Watchdog, South
China Morning Post, Feb. 27, 1994, at 14, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter
Textline File (quoting Dr. Sohmen, a Chinese shipping baron, predicting that in 1996
when the existing fleet is 20 years old, repair prices will be quite high); Why Ship-
Owners Must Change Tack, supra note 224.
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Pollution Act of 1990,22 which limits the types of vessels that the
United States permits in its waters.229
Despite a clear need for new vessels, banks are very hesitant to lend
money to the industry230 due to the many defaults and bankruptcies
that occurred in the 1980s.231 The maritime community has recog-
nized the need for capital and has taken steps to attract investment by
increasing lender security. 32 Lenders who are willing to invest may
well require that they retain the ability to "react quickly and forcibly
to deteriorating credit situations" to stem any losses. 3 3 Nonetheless,
the maritime industry is often not an attractive investment because of
the low profit margin and high likelihood of failure.2- Any tightening
of the credit market as a result of the needless intrusion of bankruptcy
law will have an adverse effect on the industry at this crucial rebuild-
ing time.
The subjection of maritime assets to two bodies of law and two
courts poses problems for the maritime industry. While maritime law
228. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994).
229. The act prohibits the presence of single hull tankers over 23 years old in
United States waters after the year 2000; after the year 2015, all vessels must have
double hulls. 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Jeffrey D. Morgan, The Oil
Pollution Act of 1990: A Look at its Impact on the Oil Industry, 6 Fordham Envtl. LJ.
1, 6-7 (1994). In 1991, 40% of the world's fleet consisted of single hull vessels. Why
Ship-owners Must Change Tack, supra note 224.
230. George Wood, Lending to Shipowners; Bank Lending, J. of Com. Lending,
Aug. 1995, at 25, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
231. The mid-1980s were disastrous years for the shipping industry. See Dorinda
Elliott, Will Debt Sink Another Asian Fleet?, Bus. Wk., Dec. 2, 1985, at 48 (describing
the financial difficulties of the Tung group, then one of the world's largest shipping
concerns); Andrew Fisher, Anxious Days for the Banks: World Shipping Finance, Fn.
Times, Nov. 27, 1985, at 25 (describing the financial difficulties of large shipping
lines); Willoughby, supra note 226, at 116 (characterizing shipping as the -latest lend-
ing disaster area").
232. Recognizing the need to attract investment through increased lender security,
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the International
Maritime Organization held a convention to unify further the priority of maritime
liens. Christina M. Krescanko, Maritime Liens, in Recent Developments in Maritime
Law, 18 Tul. Mar. L. 259, 294-95 (1994). The 1993 International Convention on
Maritime Liens and Mortgages limits the number of liens payable before a ship mort-
gage to five. Id. at 295. The five are: "(1) claims due to the master and crew, (2)
claims for loss of life and personal injury, (3) salvage rewards; (4) port, canal, water-
way, and pilotage dues; and (5) claims for physical loss or damage caused by the
operation of the vessel other than damage to cargo, containers, and passengers' ef-
fects." Id.
233. Wood, supra note 230, at 25.
234. Liner shipping has "high fixed costs and low marginal costs, relatively inelastic
and divisible demand, indivisible supply," and shippers must regularly schedule sail-
ings "irrespective of the amount of cargo available." Hearings on S. 1356 Ocean Ship-
ping Reform Act Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce Science and Transportation,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statements of Murray Graham, Deputy Secretary Gen-
eral of the Council of European and Japanese National Shipowners' Association),
available in LEXIS, Legis Library, CNGTST File. Thus, shippers "inexorably drive
rates down below average costs to noncompensatory marginal cost levels in order to
seek cargo to fill empty space." Id.
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is tailored to the needs of the maritime industry, bankruptcy law is
not. The application of both laws appears unnecessary and avoidable.
IV. ANY INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY TREATY SHOULD
RECOGNIZE THE PRIMACY OF ADMIRALTY LAW OVER
MARITIME ASSETS
The drafters of any future international insolvency treaty should
recognize the primacy of admiralty law over maritime assets. This
part first examines how such a provision will eliminate the problems
presented by the application of two potentially conflicting bodies of
law. It then argues that such a provision would not prejudice any of
the parties to the bankruptcy proceeding.
A. Reconciling the Two Bodies of Law
A partially accepted international insolvency treaty that recognizes
the primacy of admiralty law over maritime assets would prohibit a
bankruptcy proceeding from interfering with an admiralty action. The
court exercising admiralty jurisdiction would have exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the maritime assets. The lienors would be able to protect
their rights to the full extent of maritime law, free of restraint by the
bankruptcy proceeding.235 Additionally, the exclusive application of
admiralty law to maritime assets would eliminate the unnecessary in-
trusion of bankruptcy law. The maritime lienor would save the ex-
pense of petitioning the court for relief from the automatic stay.236
Moreover, the maritime lienor would be able to pursue his claim
swiftly in the most convenient forum available. 237 Under a bank-
ruptcy treaty that provides for the exclusive application of admiralty
law to maritime assets, a court would not waste its efforts in needless
supervision of maritime lienors under bankruptcy law or needless liti-
gation about the reach of its personal jurisdiction over them.238 Fi-
nally, the primacy of admiralty law will protect the market for vessel
finance. 239 Thus, recognition of the primacy of admiralty law will
eliminate the problems arising from the application of both admiralty
and bankruptcy law.
B. The Exclusive Application of Admiralty Law to Maritime Assets
Would Not Prejudice Maritime Interests
The maritime industry already has in place a system that accom-
plishes the theoretical goals of an international insolvency treaty.
Thus, an international insolvency treaty that provided for the exclu-
235. See supra notes 185-96 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 212-19 and accompanying text.
239. See supra part III.C.
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sive application of admiralty law to maritime assets would not preju-
dice the maritime industry. Bankruptcy practitioners seek an
international insolvency treaty to resolve problems arising from the
refusal to defer to foreign bankruptcy proceedings and the nonen-
forcement of foreign bankruptcy judgments. 40 The problems that a
treaty addresses and the benefits that a treaty provides, however, are
not really applicable to the maritime industry.
While many jurisdictions do not always recognize foreign bank-
ruptcy decrees,241 they do grant universal recognition to the decrees
reached by application of admiralty law. 42 Moreover, a treaty can
only achieve partial acceptance, 43 while admiralty law already enjoys
universal acceptance.' Thus, an international insolvency treaty does
not provide anything to the maritime industry that admiralty law itself
does not already provide. The drafters of an international insolvency
treaty, therefore, will not prejudice the maritime industry by exempt-
ing it from such a treaty.
Additionally, the provisions of an international insolvency treaty
would not particularly benefit the maritime industry. First, an interna-
tional insolvency treaty would promote the equal treatment of bank-
ruptcy creditors because it would pool all the debtor's assets and rank
all of the creditors under a unified system in a single forum.2 4 Be-
cause the adjudication of all maritime liens on a single vessel takes
place in a single forum under a single nation's ranking system, admi-
ralty law already treats maritime creditors fairly by classifying them
according to their expectations.2 6 Second, a treaty would maximize
asset return by minimizing the costs of duplicative proceedings and
realizing enhanced values related to economic units of sale.247 Mari-
time parties, however, do not benefit from such a treaty because the
creditors already have the capability to assert their maritime liens in a
single proceeding.24 Finally, a treaty will facilitate the reorganization
of a debtor. 249 The maritime industry does not benefit from this result
of an international insolvency treaty as the reorganization of an inter-
240. See supra notes 64-96 and accompanying text.
241. See Gaa, supra note 23, at 887.
242. See supra notes 152 and accompanying text. The decree must be pursuant to
an arrest in rem. See e.g., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. F/V Maigus Luck, 243 F. Supp. 8, 9
(D. Canal Zone 1965) (refusing to recognize a Panamanian court decree because the
vessel was never within the territorial waters of Panama).
243. See supra notes 100-16 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
246. See supra part II.A (describing admiralty as an ancient, internationally consis-
tent body of law that developed in reponse to industry needs). Maritime creditors'
willingness to extend credit reflects their expectations under admiralty law.
247. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
248. See Berlingieri, supra note 17, at 108 (noting that no ship "may be arrested
more than once in respect to the same maritime claim"); Gilmore & Black, supra note
12, at 788 (noting how single admiralty proceeding discharges all liens on a vessel).
249. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
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national shipping company is unlikely for two reasons.25 0 The condi-
tion of the shipping market, a surplus in vessels, and a decline in
demand for cargo are usually the source of the shipping company's
financial failure and those general market conditions will continue to
exist during the reorganization.25 ' Additionally, reorganization is un-
likely to succeed because foreign courts may arrest vessels in violation
of the bankruptcy court's stay. 52
C. The Effect on Other Bankruptcy Participants Is Neutral
An insolvency treaty provision ensuring the exclusive application of
admiralty law to maritime assets would not affect the nonmaritime
parties to a bankruptcy proceeding. Neither the creditors other than
maritime lienors nor the bankruptcy court itself would suffer signifi-
cant adverse effects as a result of a treaty's express recognition of
what is currently a practical reality. The primacy of admiralty law
over maritime assets would not prejudice these parties because it
merely takes the vessel and maritime lienors out of the bankruptcy
court's control at the very beginning of a bankruptcy proceeding
rather than later in the process. Under a partially accepted interna-
tional insolvency treaty, a foreign court would be likely to take control
over the maritime assets and adjudicate them pursuant to admiralty
law apart from the international bankruptcy proceeding anyway. 53
Nonmaritime creditors will not be prejudiced by the exclusive appli-
cation of admiralty law. Under an international insolvency treaty, a
bankruptcy proceeding would treat creditors of the same class equally
by ensuring that those creditors would receive equal recoveries from a
pool of assets.254 Removing the vessel from that pool of assets by pro-
viding for its disposition under admiralty law would theoretically de-
crease the total amount in the pool. The bankruptcy court, however,
would be unlikely to include a vessel in that pool of assets. Creditors
located in a nonsignatory nation, and thus outside the bankruptcy
250. Rutherglen, supra note 177, at 532; see Keech, supra note 12, at 1246; see, e.g.,
Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 585 F. Supp 1227, 1228 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (detailing how Hellenic originally tried to reorganize but eventually underwent
liquidation). But see Landers, supra note 153, at 509 n.79 (stating that a shipping com-
pany might successfully reorganize). At present, if the creditors believe a shipping
company can successfully reorganize, they may rely on private agreements to do so.
The Ten Most Lawyer-Intensive Deals of 1986: Herbert Smith, White and Case, Ste-
phenson Harwood and Lo and Milbank Tweed Hadley and McCloy: The Restructur-
ing of Wah Kwong Shipping, Euromoney Int'l Fm. L., Jan. 20, 1987, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter Textline File ("[T]he plan... mark[s] a new approach
to international non-sovereign restructurings outside the ambit of court-approved
procedures.").
251. See Rutherglen, supra note 177, at 525.
252. Id. at 532.
253. See supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
254. See Dalhuisen, supra note 1, § 2.03[3], at 3-186 to 3-187 & n.34; see also West-
brook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 2, at 755-56 (detailing a coordinated
claims procedure).
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court's jurisdiction,"5 would have arrested the vessel, thus precluding
its inclusion in the bankruptcy court's asset pool. 56 Moreover, mari-
time lienors are traditionally favored over unsecured creditors. The
bankruptcy court, under an international bankrupcy treaty, will most
likely treat maritime lienors as secured creditors," although their ex-
act position in the priority of distribution cannot be predicted. Thus,
even if the vessel was sold in the bankruptcy proceeding, the proceeds
from the sale would have first gone to satisfy the claims of maritime
lienors as secured creditors."5 If the foreign court sells the vessel
under admiralty law, after maritime lienors are paid, any remaining
proceeds can be returned to the bankruptcy court. 59 One commenta-
tor has argued that bankruptcy laws should not treat maritime lienors
as secured creditors because the seemingly arbitrary special treatment
of maritime lienors gives them unwarranted preferred status.26 TIhis
preferred status, however, has existed under the law in most maritime
nations for centuries and has become ingrained in the daily business of
the maritime industry. A provision recognizing the primacy of admi-
ralty law over maritime assets merely maintains the status quo.
Under an international insolvency treaty that provides for the ex-
clusive application of admiralty law to maritime assets, a bankruptcy
court would give up control of a portion of the debtor's assets over
which it would have exercised control absent such a provision. If ves-
sels and maritime lienors are not subject to separate treatment, a
bankruptcy proceeding can theoretically adjudicate the entire bank-
ruptcy process in accordance with the universal goals of such a treaty.
Even under an international insolvency treaty, however, the bank-
ruptcy court would probably have eventually released both the vessel
and the maritime lienors from its control. 61 Providing for the disposi-
tion of maritime assets under admiralty law simply expressly recog-
255. Under an international insolvency treaty, the bankruptcy cour. 's jurisdiction
would effectively extend to all signatory nations because all the courts involved would
cooperate in a unified procedure. See Nadelmann, supra note 29, at 77.
256. See supra notes 159-75 and accompanying text.
257. Staring, supra note 50, at 1178. See David W. Skeen, Liens and Liquidation:
Preferences, Strong Arm Clause; Fraudulent Transfers, Equitable Subordination, Pri-
orities and Other Limitations on Liens Claims, 59 Tul. L Rev. 1401, 1402 (1985); In Re
Aro Co., 1980 1 All E.R. 1067, 1068 (C.A.). Significant complications would arise
from individual international bankruptcy courts' application of their own bankruptcy
laws to alter the secured status of a maritime lien because the lienor would not know
at the time the lien arose whether he could enforce it in the future. See Gilmore &
Black, supra note 12, at 813; Skeen, supra, at 1402-03.
258. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text (discussing how secured credi-
tors are paid before unsecured creditors).
259. Gilmore & Black, supra note 12, at 788.
260. See generally Michael J. Ende, Note, Adrift on a Sea of Red Ink. The Status of
Maritime Liens in Bankruptcy, 11 Fordham Int'l LJ. 573, 585-86 (1988) (describing
how the person who paints the ship gets a lien, but the person who paints the dock
does not).
261. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
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nizes the unique status of maritime assets and makes the disposition of
such assets more efficient by avoiding a temporary detour through the
bankruptcy proceeding.
CONCLUSION
While an international insolvency treaty may aim for a universal
bankruptcy system, such a treaty offers no meaningful improvement
over current law. At best, only some courts will grant recognition to
the decisions of foreign bankruptcy courts. Recognition will only be
reciprocal between treaty signatories. By contrast, courts already give
full effect to foreign admiralty decrees. When a vessel inevitably ar-
rives in the port of a nation that does not share an insolvency treaty
with the nation adjudicating the bankruptcy, the vessel and maritime
lienors participating in the bankruptcy proceeding will soon find
themselves back in court pursuant to admiralty law. In the end, the
maritime parties have traveled a circuitous and expensive route.
An international insolvency treaty must recognize the primacy of
admiralty law over the vessel and maritime lienors. A treaty vesting
control over the disposition of the debtor's maritime assets in the
same court as the rest of the debtor's assets will not successfully pre-
clude a foreign court from arresting ships and adjudicating the mari-
time claims. A provision for the exclusive application of admiralty
law merely recognizes and accepts such a result. The consequences of
such a provision for the nonmaritime parties to the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding are minor. Yet, such a practical provision will eliminate the
risks placed on maritime lienors, the needless expenses arising from
the supervision of maritime lienors in the bankruptcy proceeding, and
the increased cost of maritime credit that would result from the appli-
cation of both laws to the same debt. Drafters of an international
insolvency treaty should realize that recognizing the primacy of admi-
ralty law over maritime assets steers the most appropriate course.
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